300 M. Hoffman et al. Fig. 4. The Coordination A EB Game. In our applications, A stands for punish, and B stands for don’t punish A@ » Bc | @® attention or do not have enough time to react with better judgment (DeScioli et al., 2011). Relative to the example of the tennis player with the allergy described above, it is usually hard to distinguish between a competitor who does not notice his opponent orders the dish with the allergen versus one who notices but does not care. In contrast, transgressions of commission must be intended almost by definition. 4, Suppose the witness knows an omission was intentional: In the above example, the tennis player’s opponent’s allergy is widely known, and the witness saw the player watch his opponent order the offending dish, had time to react, thought about it, but did not to say anything. The witness suspects that others do not know the competitor was aware his opponent ordered the dish, but believes the tennis player should be condemned for purposely withholding information from his competitor. However, since the witness does not wish to be the sole con- demner, she is unlikely to condemn. In contrast, when a witness observes a trans- gression of commission (e.g., the player recommends the dish), the witness is relatively confident that others present interpret the transgression as purposely harmful, since his recommendation reveals that the player was obviously paying attention and therefore intended to harm his opponent. So, if all other individuals present condemn the tennis player when they observe the commission, each does not anticipate being the sole condemner. For the above result to hold, all that is needed is the following: (1) The more the costs of punishment decrease, the more others punish and (2) omissions are usually unintended (Dalkiran, Hoffman, Paturi, Ricketts, & Vattani, 2012; Hoffman et al., 2015).* *Tn fact, even if one knows that others know that the transgression was intended, omission will still