82 CASSELL ET AL. [Vol. 104 Manson case>.”!?”? Thus, Black’s Law Dictionary does not help resolve the dispute as to which of the two meanings should be used, as there are clearly differing meanings. While OLC’s reading may be a permissible one, so is a pro-victim reading. OLC also tums to the CVRA’s legislative history to bolster its conclusion. But, here again, its analysis is misleading. OLC relies on a passage from Senate floor colloquy between Senators Jon Kyl and Dianne Feinstein regarding the CVRA’s scope. In OLC’s recounting of the legislative history, the floor statements “emphasize that the nght to confer relates to the conduct of criminal proceedings after the filing of charges.”!78 For instance, OLC quotes Senator Kyl stating that “[u|nder this provision, victims are able to confer with the Government’s attorney about proceedings after charging.”'*° This is a truncated and deceptive description of the legislative history, so much so that Senator Kyl sent an angry letter to Attorney General Eric Holder complaining about the distortion. On June 6, 2011, the Senator wrote to “express [his] surprise that [OLC is] so clearly quoting [his] remarks out of context.”'°° Senator Kyl then went on to observe that the colloquy began by noting that the nght to confer “is intended to be expansive.”'*! The Senator further discussed various “examples” of when the right to confer applied, including “any critical stage or disposition of the case. The right, however, is not limited to these examples.”!*? It was against that backdrop that Senator Kyl gave the example of conferring about proceedings “after charging.” In his letter to Attorney General Holder, Senator Kyl also noted that he had: made clear that crime victims had rights under the CVRA even before an indictment is filed. For example, ... I made clear that crime victims had a right to consult about both ‘the case’ and ‘case proceedings’—1.e., both about how the case was being handled before being filed in co