Case No.: 502009CA040800XXXXMBAG Edwards' Opposition to Epstein's Motion for Summary Judgment Page 12 of 15 reliance on public filings, including the Scherer Complaint against Rothstein is unavailing. As discussed above, the evidence warrants the finding that Epstein knew that Edwards was legitimately pursuing the claims on behalf of his clients which included the effort to secure testimony from Epstein’s close confidants. Therefore, Epstein cannot rely upon the referenced public documents to support his claims against Edwards given that he knows that information to be untrue and he refuses to answer questions about the veracity of the information. See Exh. G at pgs. 53:6-24; 78:16-24; 87:20-88:14. Consequently, Epstein had no good faith basis to rely on such information. Epstein’s Assertion of his Fifth Amendment Privilege Gives Rise to Adverse Inferences Pertinent to His Motion for Summary Judgment and Precludes His Reliance on Purported Undisputed Facts As discussed above, Epstein’s multiple invocations of his Fifth Amendment Privilege results in adverse inferences which directly impact the issues advanced in his Motion for Summary Judgment. “It is well settled that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.” Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); Accord, Vasquez v. State, 777 So. 2d 1200, 1203 (Fla. at 2001). The reason for this rule “is both logical and utilitarian. A party may not trample upon the rights of others and then escape the consequences by invoking a constitutional privilege — at least not in a civil setting.” Fraser v. Security and INV. Corp, 615 So. 2d. 841, 842 (Fla. 4" DCA 1993). The adverse inferences drawn from Epstein’s assertion of the Fifth Amendment undercut his claim of justifiable reliance based upon the purported undisputed material facts to support his Motion for Summary Judgment. Moreover, because