230 12 The Engineering and Development of Ethics would be afforded the same rights as its previous human incarnation. However, if AGIs were to be considered second class citizens and deprived of free will, why would it be any better or safer to do so for a human that has been uploaded? It would not, and indeed, an uploaded human mind not having evolved in a purely digital environment may be much more prone to erratic and dangerous behavior than an AGI. An upload without verifiable continuity of consciousness would be no different than an AGI. It would merely be some sentience in a machine, one that was “programmed” in an unusual way, but which has no particular claim to any special humanness — merely an alternate encoding of some subset of human knowledge and independent volitional behavior, which is exactly what first generation AGIs will have. The problem of continuity of consciousness in uploading is very similar to the problem of the Turing test: it assumes specialness on the part of biological humans, and requires acceptability to their particular theory of mind in order to be considered sentient. Should consciousness (or at. least the less mystical sounding intelligence, independent volition, and self-awareness) be achieved in AGIs or uploads in a manner that is not acceptable to human theory of mind, it may not be considered sapient and worthy of any of the ethical treatment afforded sapient entities. This can occur not only in “strange consciousness” cases in which we can’t perceive that there is some intelligence and volition; even if such an entity is able to communicate with us in a comprehensible manner and carry out actions in the real world, our innately wired theory of mind may still reject it as not sufficiently like us to be worthy of consideration. Such an attitude could turn out to be a grave mistake, and should be guarded against as we progress towards these possibilities. 12.7 Possible Benefits of Closely Linking AGIs to the Global Brain Some