11.4 Piaget’s Stages in the Context of Uncertain Inference 199 Davidson [Dav84], Dennett [Den&87] and others support the common belief that theory of mind is dependent upon linguistic ability. A major challenge to this prevailing philosophical stance came from Premack and Woodruff [PW78] who postulated that prelinguistic primates do indeed exhibit “theory of mind” behavior. While Premack and Woodruff’s experiment itself has been challenged, their general result has been bolstered by follow-up work showing similar results such as [TC97]. It seems to us that while theory of mind depends on many of the same inferential capabilities as language learning, it is not intrinsically dependent on the latter. There is a school of thought often called the Theory Theory [BW88, Car85, Wel90] holding that a child’s understanding of mind is best understood in terms of the process of iteratively formulating and refuting a series of naive theories about others. Alternately, Gordon [Gor86] postulates that theory of mind is related to the ability to run cognitive simulations of others’ minds using one’s own mind as a model. We suggest that these two approaches are actually quite harmonious with one another. In an uncertain AGI context, both theories and simulations are grounded in collections of uncertain implications, which may be assembled in context- appropriate ways to form theoretical conclusions or to drive simulations. Even if there is a special “mind-simulator” dynamic in the human brain that carries out simulations of other minds in a manner fundamentally different from explicit inferential theorizing, the inputs to and the behavior of this simulator may take inferential form, so that the simulator is in essence a way of efficiently and implicitly producing uncertain inferential conclusions from uncertain premises. We have thought through the details by CogPrime system should be able to develop theory of mind via embodied experience, though at time of writing practical learn