178 10 A Mind-World Correspondence Principle 10.2 What Might a General Theory of General Intelligence Look Like? It’s not clear, at this point, what a real "general theory of general intelligence" would look like — but one tantalizing possibility is that it might confront the two questions: e How does one design a world to foster the development of a certain sort of mind? e How does one design a mind to match the particular challenges posed by a certain sort of world? One way to achieve this would be to create a theory that, given a description of an environment and some associated goals, would output a description of the structure and dynamics that a system should possess to be intelligent in that environment relative to those goals, using limited computational resources. Such a theory would serve a different purpose from the mathematical theory of "universal intelligence" developed by Marcus Hutter [Hut05] and others. For all its beauty and theoreti- cal power, that approach currently gives it useful conclusions only about general intelligences with infinite or infeasibly massive computational resources. On the other hand, the approach suggested here is aimed toward creation of a theory of real-world general intelligences utilizing realistic amounts of computational power, but still possessing general intelligence comparable to human beings or greater. This reflects a vision of intelligence as largely concerned with adaptation to particular classes of environments and goals. This may seem contradictory to the notion of "general" intelligence, but I think it actually embodies a realistic understanding of general intelligence. Maximally general intelligence is not pragmatically feasible; it could only be achieved using infinite com- putational resources [[ut05]. Real-world systems are inevitably limited in the intelligence they can display in any real situation, because real situations involve finite resources, including finite amounts of time. One may say th