HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012390 second, the creation of an opportunity for a court challenge through non-enforcement (e.g., Myers). 2) Appropriations Limitation for Rules Vetoed by Congress, 4B Op. 0.L.C. 731 (1980): In this opinion we rejected the constitutionality of a proposed legislative veto, prior to the Court's decision in Chadha. We opined that "[t]o regard this provision as legally binding would impair the Executive's constitutional role and would constitute an abdication of the responsibility of the Executive Branch." Id. at 734. It should be noted that the legislation in question was pending in Congress, and the possibility that President Carter would sign the legislation did not affect our analysis of the constitutional issue. We simply stated that, "if enacted, the [legislative veto provision] will not have any legal effect." Id. 3) Issues Raised by Section 102(c)(2) of H.R. 3792, 14 Op. O.L.C. 38 (1990) (preliminary print): This opinion also addressed then-pending legislation, in this case the foreign relations authorization bill for fiscal years 1990 and 1991. The opinion found that a provision of the bill was unconstitutional and severable. Regarding non-execution, the opinion stated that "at least in the context of legislation that infringes the separation of powers, the President has the constitutional authority to refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws." Id. at 53. The opinion concluded that "if the President chooses to sign H.R. 3792, he would be constitutionally authorized to decline to enforce" the constitutionally objectionable section. Id. at 38. 4) Issues Raised by Section 129 of Pub. L. No. 102-138 and Section 503 of Pub. L. No. 102-140, 16 Op. O.L.C. 18 (1992) (preliminary print): This opinion concluded that two statutory provisions that limited the issuance of official and diplomatic passports were unconstitutional and were severable from the remainder of the two statutes. On the question of non-execution, the opinion reject