/ BARAK / 144 was off the agenda. The diplomatic process with the Palestinians was stalemated. I could see no point in remaining in the government. Like my last period in Olmert’s government, my final few months were dominated by finding a way to end Hamas attacks from Gaza. During one 24-hour period in November, Hamas launched more than 100 rockets at towns in the south, while also attacking two military units across the border. Especially since our military response would be the last during my time as Defense Minister, I was determined that, this time, it would have a strictly defined objective and a finite time frame. The overall objective hadn’t changed since Olmert’s premiership: to hit Hamas hard, bring down the number of rocket attacks to as near zero as possible, and reach an agreement, through the Egyptians, which established a period of calm on our border for as long as we could. Bibi’s “victimhood” narrative notwithstanding, one aspect of the military balance in the south was now dramatically different. With my backing as Defense Minister, we now had Iron Dome, which I was confident would help deal with the inevitable shower of Hamas rockets that would follow our initial attack. Again, I felt it was essential to start with a quick, unexpected, damaging first strike. Then, through sustained air bombardment, to keep up enough pressure to secure the political arrangement we wanted. And, unlike under Olmert, to end the operation as soon as we’d achieved its aim. On the afternoon of November 14, we launched a targeted air strike on Hamas’s de facto chief of staff, Ahmed Jabari. We’d gone after Jabari in the past but, for one reason or another, had failed. We also hit nearly two dozen other Hamas targets, including all of the main missile sites we had identified. The whole operation lasted a week. Hamas fired nearly 1,500 rockets into Israel, not just locally manufactured Qassems but longer-range Iranian Fajr-5s and Russian Grads. For the first time since the