/ BARAK / 131 whether that would even be possible to strike before the Iranians entered their “zone of immunity” — the point at which the amount of damage we could do to their nuclear program would be too negligible to be worth the operational, political and diplomatic risks from such an attack. In the early months, my priority was to ensure we at least had a military option. A full year before joining Bibi’s government, as Defense Minister under Olmert, I’d first tried to put an operational plan in place, only to find that the lack of heavy munitions and refuelling aircraft made it impossible. That was especially frustrating because at that point, our experts calculated that a successful strike could have set back the Iranian nuclear effort by about six years. Given the Iranians’ knowledge we could attack again, and their need to restart clandestine efforts to secure key components abroad, that meant a very real prospect of ending the nuclear program altogether. On joining Bibi’s government, I began working, both with the Airya and the engineers and technological experts in our military industries, to make sure we had the weaponry and equipment, and an operational plan for a surgical strike. It was not until mid- 2010, a year into Bibi’s government, that I was confident we’d reached that point, in part thanks to Israeli-produced heavy bombs and tanker aircraft. Our experts estimated we would still be able to set back the Iranian nuclear efforts by up to four years, almost certainly enough to end them indefinitely. Yet making military action possible proved to be the easy part. The question now became whether we should be prepared to launch a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Answering it was like a contest of three-dimensional chess, involving both an internal debate among Israel’s political and military leadership and discussions with an Obama administration whose priority remained to negotiate an end to Iran’s nuclear program. On major security decisions