/ BARAK / 130 up in our inner Group of Eight discussions, I could usually count only on Dan Meridor, and occasionally a handful of others, to argue in favor of any form of initiative on our side. In private meetings, Bibi did sometimes engage in discussion about what Israel might do. But he invariably steered the conversation elsewhere, insisting that the real issue was the Palestinians’ lack of any interest in making peace. My main worry wasn’t the immediate future of the negotiations. For now, the chances of an agreement seemed close to zero. It was the longer-term damage Bibi’s approach would do in further delaying any serious move by Israel to put our relations with the Palestinians on a more stable and sustainable footing. The dithering, delay and deadlock suited him politically. Ironically, my own efforts on the security front had also made it easier for us to do next to nothing. Intermittent outbreaks of violence always remained a threat. Yet the West Bank security fence, along with our military, police and intelligence measures, meant it was very unlikely we’d see a return to the full-blown terror war of the second intifada. I was also working to secure US support for our development of increasingly effective anti-missile weapons to reduce the threat from Hamas in Gaza. The overall result was that for many, if not most, Israelis, the conflict with the Palestinians didn’t impact on their day-to-day lives. It was unseen and largely unfelt. Still, the effect of the stalemate on our relationship with Washington did matter: both for our security cooperation on things like the anti-missile weapons and, crucially, the challenge which had led me into Bibi’s government in the first place: keeping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. * * * It was a race against time. The Iranians were producing more and more yellowcake, building more advanced centrifuges, accumulating more low-enriched uranium. They were getting better at hiding and protecting the network of facili