/ BARAK / 129 process, it was hedged with several conditions. The freeze would not be open- ended, but last for 10 months, as a way of boosting the effort to restart negotiations. It would apply to new construction, not work already underway. And it would exclude the post-1967 neighborhoods inside the expanded city limits of Jerusalem. Like his other moves, it was also dismissed as insignificant by the Palestinians. Though there was a formal restarting of the talks, they went almost nowhere during the period of the freeze, which Bibi cited as a reason for not extending it further. From then on, the negotiations produced even less. I didn’t buy the narrative that this was entirely Bibi’s fault. Abu Mazen remained steadfastly, deliberately passive. Obviously not inclined to take the risk of further widening his rift with Hamas in Gaza, he was content to echo the Obama administration’s argument that nothing could happen until there was a settlement freeze. Once the freeze was announced, he went through the motions, avoiding all the difficult issues, in the expectation Washington would ensure the freeze was renewed. President Obama’s initial Mideast moves had made it much easier for Abu Mazen to avoid any serious engagement. In contrast to past presidents, Obama had placed almost all of the onus for progress on Israel. But the end result also suited Bibi. Though I never entirely gave up hope of persuading him it was in Israel’s interest to seek a resolution of our conflict with the Palestinians, it became more evident as the months went on that his aim was simply to keep things ticking over, and avoid any major new crisis. He appointed an old personal friend — a corporate lawyer named Yitzhak Molcho — as our negotiator. I finally realized how pointless the exercise was when, during a visit to the United States, I found myself in New York at the same time as Molcho. We met at the Israeli consulate. We spoke in detail about the state of the negotiations. With Molcho stil