/ BARAK / 123 operational capacity to mount such an attack, in part because we lacked the necessary bunker-busting bombs and the tanker aircraft to get us to Iran and back. I did seek help from the Americans. I met Defense Secretary Bob Gates, CIA director Mike Hayden, National Security Adviser Steve Hadley and even President Bush himself. While not explicitly mentioning that we were planning military action against Iran, I sounded them out on the prospects of getting more heavy munitions, and possibly leasing several US tanker aircraft. Yet in our final meeting with President Bush, during a visit to Israel in June 2008, he made it clear to Olmert and me that he knew what we were up to. Olmert hosted a private dinner for the President. Afterwards, Bush asked to talk privately. Olmert poured us each a glass of whiskey and lit a cigar, and we sank into brown leather armchairs. Smiling, the president looked straight at me, and said to Olmert: “This guy scares the living shit out of me when he tells me what you want.” He told Olmert how I’d asked for heavy munitions, tankers and a variety of other military equipment. “Remember. I’m a former F-16 pilot,” he said. “I know how to connect the dots.” Then, turning more serious, he added: “I want to tell both of you now, as President, the formal position of the US government. We are totally against any action by you to mount an attack on the nuclear plants.” The effect was all the more dramatic because of his Administration’s support for our attack on the reactor in Syria the year before. “I repeat,” Bush said, “in order to avoid any misunderstanding. We expect you not to do it. And we’re not going to do it, either, as long as I am President. I wanted it to be clear.” Olmert said nothing, so I replied. “Mr President, we’re in no position to tell you what the position of the United States should be. But I can tell you what I believe history will have to say. I’m reminded by what we call, in field artillery, ‘bracketing and