/ BARAK / 117 reactor near Baghdad, there was never any question that we would take any and all possible measures to prevent Syria from getting a nuclear weapon. An immutable, core assumption in Israel’s security strategy was the need to retain our ability to deter, and if necessary defeat, our enemies. A nuclear Syria — or Iraq, or Iran — would dramatically alter the balance of power in the region, at obvious risk to Israel. Syria posed a particular threat, as part of an increasingly close alliance with Iran, and with Hizbollah in Lebanon. The question, however, was how and when to strike the reactor. Olmert wanted to attack within days. He seemed to assume that, as a former chief of staff, 'd nod enthusiastically and go along with him. I did understand the reasons for his sense of urgency. Not only did we have to make sure we attacked before the fuel was on site. There was always the risk the Syrians would find out that we were aware of their nuclear facility, putting them on even higher alert. But the operational challenge was complex. We need a fail-safe plan to destroy the reactor. We had to do it in such a way as to avoid a full-scale military confrontation with Syria if possible. And we had to ensure we were ready for that, if it did happen. It took very little time for me to realize that none of those prerequisites was yet in place. Not unlike the recent Lebanon war, we were choosing between two off-the-shelf plans from the kirya. One involved using a large military force, and would almost certainly draw us into a major conflict with Syria. The other was a smaller, targeted operation. But it remained untested, and there was no certainty it would actually destroy the reactor. Over the next few months, Olmert got more and more frustrated with the fact we hadn’t yet attacked, and frustrated with me as well. We held dozens of meetings, sometimes two or three a day, chaired by the Prime Minister, sometimes by me as Defense Minister, or by the chief of staff or