/ BARAK / 77 moment in the summit. If we cou/d find common ground, he said, Israel would have achieved what had eluded it under Rabin, and even Ben-Gurion: “‘end of conflict, and Jerusalem recognized internationally as your capital.” I told him that the discussion with my negotiators had been moving and illuminating. “I could see how much it weighed on everyone.” But I added that I still did not feel anything of a similar nature, or remotely as serious, was happening on the Palestinian side. I also said that in deciding how to proceed, I couldn’t ignore political realities back home. I would have to get any major change in our position concerning Jerusalem through the Knesset, even before putting a peace agreement to a referendum. “When will you get back to me with your paper?” he asked. I said I’d try by midnight. I also asked him whether he could delay going to the G8 summit in Japan, for which he was due to leave Camp David on the morning of the 19". That meant we had just one full day left. I said even if the plan was to resume our talks afterward, I couldn’t move on Jerusalem right before we recessed. It would mean “putting my last and best offer on the table” and running the risk of leaks in Israel while Clinton was gone. He said that he had to go to the G8, but would try to put off leaving for a further day. Then, he asked me to draw up a list of questions for him to present to Arafat so that we could solidify our understanding of how far he was ready to go for peace. I had Shlomo get busy on the list of questions. But it took time. We reconvened around eleven at night, to discuss both the questions and the Jerusalem package. Though it retained Israeli sovereignty over the entirety of the Old City, it did give the Palestinians a greater measure of control over other areas of East Jerusalem than any Israeli government had been willing to consider in the past. Still, almost everyone in the negotiating team could live with it, assuming it became the critical e