/ BARAK / 73 explicit. I told President Clinton I could speak only for how I would respond if a state was indeed declared without a peace deal. “We will extend Israeli sovereignty over the major settlement blocs. We will establish a security zone in the Jordan valley, and let them know that there will be a heavy price should they attack any of the outlying settlements.” In other words, Palestinian unilateral action would prompt unilateral Israeli action. “And the confrontation will begin.” * * * Clinton seemed, if not completely revived, considerably more upbeat when he came back to see me an hour later. He told me that he had received the Palestinians’ answer. The way he described it to me, Arafat had agreed to leave President Clinton to decide the amount of West Bank land that would go to a Palestinian state, a figure he now told me that he was assuming would end up at around 90 to 92 percent. The trade-off, he said, would be a limited, “symbolic” land swap. Arafat also wanted control of the Jordan Valley, but had agreed to begin negotiating on Israeli security needs there as soon as possible. Then, came Arafat’s counter-conditions, which appeared to bother the President much less than they did me. Everything would be contingent on an unspecified, “acceptable outcome on Jerusalem.” And despite Clinton’s emphasis that any meaningful agreement had to include a formal declaration that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was “over,” Arafat was insisting that could come only after the terms of whatever we agreed were fully implemented. Still, it was at least a step forward. Clinton seemed genuinely encouraged, and I didn’t want to risk closing off this first chink of light. I suggested, for instance, that we could address Arafat’s reluctance about an “end of conflict” statement by providing an American guarantee that the terms of the deal would be implemented. Still, it very soon became clear that any hope of real progress rested on by far the most difficult issue: Je