/ BARAK / 40 talks. I did realize that, “null and void” or not, our proposals or suggestions would not simply disappear from memory. But I felt the point of principle was essential if Israel was going to be able to consider the kind of far-reaching concessions which final peace deals might require. In the end, I realized that we might simply discover that Assad, and certainly Arafat, were not willing or ready to make peace. We might, initially at least, have to settle for a more incremental step. “Right here in Camp David, Begin, Sadat and Carter couldn’t complete the process,” I pointed out. “They signed a “framework agreement’ and it took months of further diplomacy to reach a peace treaty. Maybe we ll end up doing the same.” But I told the President I was convinced that if we didn’t try to get agreements, we’d have no way of knowing whether the will to make peace was there on the other side. Assad, I suspected, was the more likely to reciprocate. That was a major reason I wanted to start our efforts with him. But so far, his true intentions had never been fested, beyond his obvious determination to get back the Golan. Nor had Arafat’s, beyond his focus on the detail and extent of West Bank redeployments. President Clinton did not object to an early effort to reopen our efforts with the Syrians. But he was worried about the effects of ignoring the already-creaking prospects of fulfilling the promise of Oslo. If we were going to delay focusing on that, Clinton told me, he needed to be able to assure Arafat the wait would be worth his while. What could we give the PLO leader in return for putting off the Wye redeployments further, he asked. And then, the real question on his mind: “Ehud, when we get to the final redeployment and a peace deal, how much of the West Bank are you prepared to hand back?” I simply didn’t know at this stage. Much would depend on whether we could be sure Arafat could or would deliver a final peace. But even if I had known, I would have b