/ BARAK / 37 was coping in his trademark military uniform. Still, the mood music going into the meeting was encouraging. After the election, Arafat had tried to use his ties with the ayatollahs in Iran to get them to release 13 members of the tiny Jewish community in Shiraz who had been jailed on patently absurd accusations of spying for the “Zionist régime.” Iran had told him no. Given its support for Hizbollah, and its serial diatribes about destroying the State of Israel, this was hardly a surprise. But it was a gesture nonetheless, and I told him I appreciated it. I also arrived with a gift: a leather-bound volume with both the Hebrew Bible and Koran. I began our meeting with what I felt I most needed him to hear: that both of us were trying to achieve something hugely important, nothing less than a new relationship between Israelis and Palestinians based on trust. As I would discover in the months ahead — as Yitzhak had found as well — Arafat responded warmly to such general appeals of principle. He replied that he viewed me as a partner, and a friend. But the key issue of substance — the difference between how I envisaged taking Oslo forward and what he wanted — was impossible to avoid. I emphasized that I was committed to the further Wye River summit redeployments Bibi which had agreed, although not implemented, as well as to a release of Palestinian prisoners agreed at Wye. Yet then came the more difficult part: explaining my view of how we could best move toward a full peace agreement. I said I was convinced the prospects would be much better if we delayed the redeployments and brought forward the start of the real negotiations: on “permanent-status” issues like final borders, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees. In any case, I said, I'd need a few months for a thorough assessment of the issues involved, and to reach a settled view with my negotiating team on how to proceed. Arafat seemed to accept the idea of a pause for reflection and planning. But he held