year before. “We signed a three-phase contract with Arafat,” I said. “Try to imagine one of you selling me three pieces of property. If I fail to pay for the first one on time, you might not immediately cancel the contract. You might even be ready to help me collect the necessary money. But you would never proceed to deliver the second property before I paid for the first one, unless you were a fool.” I also warned of longer-term dangers: “terrorism, radical Islamic fundamentalism, the proliferation of surface-to-surface missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and threats to the long-term stability of the more pragmatic Arab regimes.” I singled out Iran, because it was determined to export its brand of fundamentalism Islam, sponsor terror and develop a nuclear weapon. I also accompanied CSIS colleagues on speaking engagements to other American cities. I was about to board a flight to Seattle in April when I got a message saying Rabin wanted to talk to me. After we took off, I used the on- board phone facility and, with a swipe of a credit card, was soon on the line to the Prime Minister. Since the exchange was in Hebrew, I’m fairly sure anyone overhearing me had no idea what we were talking about. “I need you to come back as soon as possible,” Rabin said. I already knew, from Giora, that he was anxious to find a long-term replacement as Minister of Interior. The leading light in the Sephardi religious party Shas, Arye Deri, had had to leave the post under allegations of bribe-taking. After Rabin had taken on the portfolio himself four 18 months, he had placed Labor’s Uzi Baram there, but only as a temporary arrangement. I didn’t feel I could refuse outright. But I reminded him that under army rules, “‘as soon as possible” still meant another 100 days. And ideally, I said I wanted to finish the best part of a year in Washington. I asked whether it would be possible to join the cabinet in the middle of November instead. “What difference will a few more months make?