Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 31 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/01/2009 Page 1 of 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO.: 09-CIV- 80469 — MARRal JANE DOE II, Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S REPLY TO & MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, ("EPSTEIN"), by and through his undersigned attorneys, replies to and moves to strike Point 4 of Plaintiff's Memorandum Of Law In Opposition To Defendant Epstein's Motion To Dismiss, dated May 22, 2009, ("MOL"). Accordingly, Defendant states: I. Legal Standard (pp. 1-2 of Plaintiffs MOL) Plaintiff's reliance on Conley v. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), as the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard is misplaced. As discussed in Defendant's motion to dismiss, (pp. 16 - 17), the standard as detailed in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), is now the applicable standard, not Conley. Although the complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations, the basis for relief in the complaint must state "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, at 1965. Further, "fflactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. The United States Supreme Court very recently made clear in Ashcroft v. baba' No. 07-1015 (U.S. May 18, EFTA02750503