plaintiffs by failing to disclose a conflict of interest and effectively "forced" the plaintiffs to keep their funds in a failing investment. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants "served as [their] financial investment advisor and broker, as well as providing other financial and banking services to (ppaintiffs, and thereby formed a fiduciary relationship with (p)laintiffs and other investors." (Am.Compl.¶¶ 10, 59-60.) In typical lender-borrower relationships, there is a presumption that the parties operate at arms-length and in their own interest. Jo-Ann's Launder Ctr, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 854 F.Supp. 387, 392 (D.Vi.1994). A fiduciary relationship may arise, however, depending upon the particular circumstances of the financial relationship. This may occur, for example, when a lender has substantial control over the borrowers business affairs. Id. Here, the plaintiffs have alleged that their relationship with Citibank and Citigroup was not the "garden-variety" at arms-length banking relationship. They claim that they and the defendants have a fifteen-year relationship and that the defendants acted as their financial advisor. I find that, for purposes of surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the amended complaint adequately states a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, I find that the defendants' argument that the Subscription Agreement between AIG and the plaintiffs bars these claims against them is without merit. A fair reading of the Subscription Agreement compels the conclusion that its main purpose is to protect AIG's interests in its dealing with Epstein and FTC. The agreement discusses at length the process by which AIG, through its agent, Citibank, will deliver income notes to Epstein, the purchaser. The Subscription Agreement contains a clause stating that neither AIG, SSB, nor Citibank is acting as a fiduciary or financial or investment adviser for the Purchaser and the Purchaser is not relying on any written or o