Page 23 21 Health Matrix 189, * associated. Professor Bainbridge considers this power of the "reputational" community to be an important reason why corporate law requires firms to be managed by a "board" and not by the fiat of a single individual. n86 Bainbridge wants this power to be deployed in advance of shareholder primacy, "9 but it can also help enable a loyal, capable multi- stakeholder corporate governance regime. Another important member of the corporate reputational community is the Delaware Court of Chancery. A number of scholars have emphasized the role that the Chancery Court plays in exposing, condemning, and shaming directorial misconduct, even where the court restrains itself from imposing actual liability or damages for the mis p2151 conduct it identifies. nm) The world of corporate directors is a fairly small one. In it, reputation and honor often matter more than pecuniary rewards, which most directors of large publicly traded corporations already have before joining the world of corporate directorships. In this culture what Delaware judges say matters as much or more than what judges do. Formally expanding the fiduciary relationship to multiple stakeholders would provide judges the occasion to celebrate or condemn corporate conduct as it relates to workers, consumers and other stakeholders, even where the Chancery Court is reluctant to formally find directors liable for damages in connection with unworthy conduct. The canonical account of corporate law is already committed to the view that reputational dynamics can serve an important part in bonding corporate directors to their principals. In fact, in the canonical account the competence of board members to police each other and keep each other true (enough) to the corporate mission serves as a crucial justification for corporate law's embrace of near total directorial discretion over the corporation's affairs, even to the extent that it allows directors to stymie the mark