Page 20 21 Health Matrix 189, * reason thus requires individuals to discuss and resolve conflicts in a manner which does not require either party to "lose" in the deep sense of being put in a position where they have to renounce their particular moral commitments in favor of their opponent's. To comply with the norm of public reason, speakers must therefore justify their public policy preferences in a manner that does not appeal to any distinct world-view. Instead of appealing to the authority of a totalizing (religious or secular) conception of the meaning and purpose of life, the norm of public reason enjoins us to articulate and defend our public policy positions with reference only to social values that are common to all world-views. But this is not mere acting. An important element in the discourse norm of public reason is that political interlocutors must be (justifiably) disposed to believe each other's speech. The norm of public reason thus requires speakers to believe in good faith that their preferred public policy advances an overlapping conception of a socially desirable outcome. To conform to the norm of public reason, you must really believe what you say, and not secretly prefer a policy simply because it advances one's privately valued world view. The discourse norm of public reason therefore requires sincerity. nn One big problem with the norm of public reason, as Dan Kahan argues, is that as a cognitive matter we humans cannot really pull it off. -*Social psychologists have demonstrated that most people quite easily, and sincerely, believe that they themselves routinely conform their public-oriented thoughts and expression to the requirements of public reason, but they are doubtful that other people do the same. Social psychologists tell us that in these assessments we are usually right about other people and wrong about ourselves. Human thinking and decision-making is profoundly influenced by cognitive biases and self-servin