Page 38 21 Health Matrix 189, * omitted). Smokers and other opponents of tobacco regulation are suspicious of these justifications and 'detect the unmistakable signature of animus toward the cultural values that smoking expresses." Id. at 137. Opponents of smoking regulation. meanwhile, also publicly conform their arguments to the norm of public reason. pointing to studies which show that smoking actually reduces public health care expenditures (because smokers die much younger than non-smokers), or by arguing that because drinking and driving causes far more harm than does second-hand smoke, public health advocates should turn their attention to restricting drinking in bars rather than forbidding smoking in bars. Id. at 138-39. Advocates of tobacco regulation look past such secular arguments and see instead opponents motivated by "a constellation of negative values, such as weakness, crudeness. and irrationality, along with a culpable heedlessness of social obligation." Id. at 137. n50 But see Ackerman. supra note 41. at 20-21. Ackerman argues that the norm of public reason is not all that difficult for humans. as is evidenced by our continual compliance with the myriad discourse norms that govern different aspects of our lives: To be a competent social actor, I must constantly engage in a process of selective repression-restraining the impulse to speak the truth on a vast number of role-irrelevant matters so as to get on with the particular form of life in which I am presently engaged. . . . Rather than assault the very idea of role playing, it seems wiser to seek relief in the marvelous human capacity to shift role engagements over time. I can be a lawyer, teacher, construction worker, father, baseball coach-as well as a liberal citizen. Id. The difference between Ackerman and Kahan is the difference between intuition and social science. Ackerman's common sense leaves him confident in our capacities for objectivity; Kahan relies on experimental