THE SUBPOENA FOR THE CONTENTS OF EPSTEIN'S COMPUTERS, EVEN IF CONSIDERED "PURELY PRIVATE PAPERS," DOES NOT VIOLATE EPSTEIN'S FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE. Lastly, Epstein argues that the subpoena seeks "purely private papers," and that a subpoena demanding those papers violates Epstein's Fifth Amendment rights, pursuant to Boyd I United States , 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Epstein's counsel correctly notes that Boyd 's analysis has been severely limited, but asserts that the "purely private paper" doctrine is still alive and applies to the contents of Epstein's computers. First, as explained above, the Fifth Amendment is a personal privilege and only the subpoenaed person can assert his own Fifth Amendment privilege. [CITE] The computers and their contents are not the personal papers of William Riley or Riley Kiraly, so the Boyd analysis does not apply to this situation at all. Second, Boyd 's statement that "purely private papers" cannot be obtained through compulsory process from a target/defendant has been eroded to the point where it no longer has any force or effect. The Supreme Court has written, as early as 1976, that "the continued validity of the broad statements contained in some of the Court's earlier cases [referring to Boyd ], have been discredited by later opinions." Andresen I Maryland , 427 U.S. 463, 472 (1976). In 1984, Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in United States I Doe , 465 U.S. 605 (1984), just to make explicit what is implicit in the analysis of that opinion; that the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind. The notion that the Fifth Amendment rotects the privacy of papers originated in Boyd I United States , . . but our decision in Fisher United States , . .. sounded the death knell for Boyd . Several of Boyd 's express or implicit declarations [had] not stood the test of time, . . . and its privacy of papers concept had long been a rule searching for a rationa